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Abstract: In this paper, a novel controlled bidirectional quantum secure direct communication 
protocol (CBQSDC) is proposed. In this scheme, both users can transmit their secret messages 
directly and simultaneously under the permission of the controller. The proposed method use feature 
of entanglement swapping which is led to more efficiency (lowest number of quantum resources 
(EPR pairs)), security and the lowest number of security checking steps. Also, a generalization of 
the protocol is explained and a protocol of CBQSDC-based network is presented. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Quantum cryptography [1] is one of the prominent issues in quantum information science which 
enables secure communication between legitimate participants using the physical laws of quantum 
mechanics. Applications of quantum cryptography includes Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) [2-
5], Quantum Secret Sharing (QSS) [6-9], Quantum Secure Direct Communication (QSDC) [10-13], 
quantum coin tossing, multi-party computation (MPC) [14-16], randomness generation [17, 18] and 
so on.  
   One of the common protocols is QKD. In 1984, the first QKD protocol (BB84) [19] was proposed 
by Bennett and Brassard. QKD aims to establish a private key between two legitimate remote users. 
In this protocol, messages are not transmitted directly. Instead, secret keys are produced after the 
quantum transmission, and then they are used to encrypt the secret messages using one-time-pad. 
The encrypted messages are then sent over the classical channel. 
   In this paper, the focus is on QSDC protocols. In contrast to QKD, a quantum secure direct 
communication (QSDC) protocol directly transmits the secret messages without sharing a private 
key in advance. So, it is more useful into QKD, if the protocol has been unconditional security. 
Beige et al. [10] proposed the first QSDC protocol using single photon two qubit states. But 
eventually, the authors themselves realized the protocol is insecure. In [20] the well-known ping-
pong protocol was presented which used EPR states for communication. It was proved later that this 
protocol was not secure in a noisy quantum channel [21]. After that, some QSDC protocols were 
proposed using different quantum states for communication [22-27]. However, they were not 
bidirectional, i.e., users could not exchange their secret messages simultaneously. For improving 
this drawback, the novel concept named as Quantum Dialogue (QD) was proposed by Nguyen [28] 
and Zhang et al. [29]. In QD [30], only one user can send his/her secret message to other at a time 
and vice versa. So, for transmitting the information in two directions, the protocol must be run twice. 
For instance, Fig. 1 shows a QD protocol using EPR pairs for communication between two 
legitimate users as introduced in [30].   
   In all of QSDC protocols, one of the problems is the security of the secret message transmitted in 
the quantum channel directly. So, without having security checking steps eavesdropper can 
successfully attack and steal some parts of the secret message. To solve this problem, Yan et al. [22] 
proposed a QSDC protocol based on EPR pairs and teleportation. In this scheme, without sending 
qubits and with local operations, secret messages are transmitted. So, this protocol, only need one 
step of security checking on the initial quantum channel. Therefore, if the secure quantum channel 
is used, this protocol is unconditionally secure (without security checking steps). Although, this 
protocol has some disadvantages. It needs an additional qubit for transmitting a message. Also, it is 
not bidirectional, i.e., it is one-way and only can transmit two-qubit from one side to other. In [31], 
Zhang and Man presented a bidirectional quantum communication protocol using entanglement 
swapping. As stated in the following, these protocols are not controllable. Another type of QSDC 
protocol is Controlled Quantum Secure Direct Communication (CQSDC). In this scheme, a sender 
can communicate with the receiver under the permission of a controller. 
 
Fig. 1: Illustration of QSDC protocol with QD method as introduced in [30].  
 
Generally, Controlled methods are safer than uncontrolled ones. As in uncontrolled ones, 
eavesdropper as a malicious user, Bob, comfortably can obtain the secret message with the scenario 
proposed in [32]. In [33] a CQSDC protocol is presented using GHZ state and feature of 
entanglement swapping. In this method, a six-qubit state is used for transmitting two message bits. 
This method is one-way and is not bidirectional. So, these methods used redundant resources and 
are not efficient. In [34], a CQSDC protocol is presented using GHZ-Like state and entanglement 
swapping. The method used in this protocol is the same as [33], and it only used GHZ-like state 
instead of GHZ state.  Work [35]  revisits one of previous works [36] and point out to the problem 
of leakage information in it. Then it presented a modified version of that work. This protocol uses 
W state. It is not bidirectional and controllable. This protocol needs to at least two-step of security; 
because secret messages are transmitted in the channel directly. Generally, above protocols are not 
optimal and use extra quantum resources. 
In 2006 [37], a controlled bidirectional QDC (CBQDC) has been proposed by Man et al. in which 
users can transmit their secret messages with permission of controller at the same time. This protocol 
uses GHZ states for transmitting secret messages. It has low efficiency and uses extra quantum 
resources. Also, this protocol needs two steps of security checking for secure communication; unlike 
title in the paper, it is not bidirectional, and it is only a type of quantum dialogue (QD). Another 
disadvantage is that Charlie as controller needs to apply a three-qubit measurement, i.e. 
measurement based on GHZ states. Also, Ye et al. [38] proposed problem of information leakage in 
[37] which part of information can be detected in this protocol, and then they improve this problem 
and also proposed another protocol using Bell states. Unfortunately, both Ye et al.’s protocols still 
had the problem of the information leakage as stated in [39, 40]. In addition, other disadvantages of 
this paper are that the new method proposed in this paper use three security checking steps and 
unlike title in the paper, it is not bidirectional, and it is only type of quantum dialogue. In [32], the 
authors proposed an intercept-and-resend attack to Ye et al. protocol and then they proposed an 
improvement to solve intercept-and-resend attack and information leakage. This method has two 
disadvantage proposed in Ye et al. protocol, i.e. it uses three security checking steps and unlike title 
in the paper, it is not bidirectional, and it is only as QD. 
In [41] a Controller-independent bidirectional quantum direct communication is proposed. In this 
protocol, two users have communication without the help of any third person so that any user cannot 
read the secret message without knowing the initial states generated by the other one. This work 
isn’t bidirectional; because, it transmits the messages in two steps. Also, it at least needs two-step 
of security checking. 
 
   In this paper, a Controlled Bidirectional Quantum Secure Direct Communication (CBQSDC) is 
presented that each user can transmit two-bit message each to other in the same time using EPR 
states under the permission of the controller. In this protocol Controller only can monitor 
communication and cannot understand the messages. So it is a blind communication from the 
perspective of the controller.  In this protocol, we improve the problems proposed in previous works. 
Because of using entanglement swapping, information is not directly transmitted between users; this 
is caused which the number of security checking steps is reduced. Then, a generalization of the 
protocol with GHZ state is presented. Finally, a protocol of CBQSDC-based network is presented. 
The proposed protocol effectively improves the quantum consumption resource into the previous 
ones. 
 
 
   The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the basic concept of entanglement 
swapping is presented. In Section 3 proposed CBQSDC protocol is presented. The security analyses 
are investigated in Section 4. In Section 5, the comparison and efficiency analysis are presented. 
Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Entanglement Swapping 
One of the most attractive features in quantum information is entanglement swapping [42-44]. Using 
this method, two particles that have never interacted can be entangled. For explaining this method, 
consider two EPR pairs with four particles labeled as 1 to 4. Qubits 1 and 2 are entangled together 
and also qubits 3 and 4 together. Also, qubits 1 and 4 are in the sender’s possession and also qubits 
2 and 3 in the receiver’s possession. In these conditions, if one of the users performs a Bell state 
measurement on her/his particles. The whole state of system collapse as shown in Eq. (1). After that, 
particles 1 and 4 are entangled together and particles 2 and 3 together. 
|𝜙+⟩12⨂|𝜙
+⟩34 =
1
√2
(|00⟩ + |11⟩)12⨂
1
√2
(|00⟩ + |11⟩)34  
=
1
2
(|00⟩12|00⟩34 + |00⟩12|11⟩34 + |11⟩12|00⟩34 + |11⟩12|11⟩34)  
=
1
2
(|00⟩14|00⟩23 + |01⟩14|01⟩23 + |10⟩14|10⟩23 + |11⟩14|11⟩23)  
=
1
2
(|𝜙+⟩14|𝜙
+⟩23 + |𝜙
−⟩14|𝜙
−⟩23 + |𝜓
+⟩14|𝜓
+⟩23 + |𝜓
−⟩14|𝜓
−⟩23).  
 
 
 
(1) 
 
As shown in Eq. (1), for instance, if the sender’s result be |𝜙+⟩14 , receiver’s outcome will be 
|𝜙+⟩23that are maximally entangled states. Also, similarity, entanglement swapping can be used in 
each different Bell state as the initial state. 
Also, the entanglement swapping can be generalized for a network of users using GHZ states. So, 
there are 64 different states for entanglement swapping between two GHZ States. For instance, 
consider a network include of three users and a GHZ state. The above statements can be written for 
it in two way as the following: 
 
1- Based on GHZ states: 
|𝜙000⟩ × |𝜙000⟩ =
1
2
((|000⟩ + |111⟩) × (|000⟩ + |111⟩))𝑎𝑏𝑐𝑑𝑒𝑓
=
1
2
(|000000⟩ + |000111⟩ + |111000⟩ + |111111⟩)𝑎𝑏𝑐𝑑𝑒𝑓
=
1
2
(|000000⟩ + |010101⟩ + |101010⟩ + |111111⟩ +
1
2
|000111⟩
+
1
2
|111000⟩ −
1
2
|000111⟩ −
1
2
|111000⟩)𝑎𝑑𝑏𝑒𝑐𝑓
= 
1
2
(|𝜙000⟩|𝜙000⟩ + |010101⟩ + |101010⟩ −
1
2
|000111⟩ −
1
2
|111000⟩
+
1
2
|010010⟩ +
1
2
|101101⟩ −
1
2
|010010⟩ −
1
2
|101101⟩)
=
1
2
(|𝜙000⟩|𝜙000⟩ + |𝜙100⟩|𝜙100⟩ −
1
2
|000111⟩ −
1
2
|111000⟩ −
1
2
|010010⟩
−
1
2
|101101⟩)
=
1
2
(|𝜙000⟩|𝜙000⟩ + |𝜙100⟩|𝜙100⟩ + |𝜙001⟩|𝜙001⟩ − |𝜙101⟩|𝜙101⟩)𝑎𝑑𝑏𝑒𝑐𝑓 
In the following table, eight different states of this entanglement swapping are seen. 
|𝜙000⟩ × |𝜙000⟩ =
1
2
((|000⟩ + |111⟩) × (|000⟩ + |111⟩))𝑎𝑏𝑐𝑑𝑒𝑓 =
1
2
(|𝜙000⟩|𝜙000⟩ + |𝜙100⟩|𝜙100⟩ + |𝜙001⟩|𝜙001⟩ − |𝜙101⟩|𝜙101⟩)𝑎𝑑𝑏𝑒𝑐𝑓   
|𝜙000⟩ × |𝜙001⟩ =
1
2
((|000⟩ + |111⟩) × (|000⟩ − |111⟩))𝑎𝑏𝑐𝑑𝑒𝑓 =
1
2
(|𝜙000⟩|𝜙001⟩ + |𝜙001⟩|𝜙000⟩ + |𝜙100⟩|𝜙101⟩ − |𝜙101⟩|𝜙100⟩)𝑎𝑑𝑏𝑒𝑐𝑓   
|𝜙000⟩ × |𝜙010⟩ =
1
2
((|000⟩ + |111⟩) × (|100⟩ + |011⟩))𝑎𝑏𝑐𝑑𝑒𝑓 =
1
2
(|𝜙100⟩|𝜙000⟩ + |𝜙101⟩|𝜙001⟩ + |𝜙000⟩|𝜙100⟩ − |𝜙001⟩|𝜙101⟩)𝑎𝑑𝑏𝑒𝑐𝑓   
|𝜙000⟩ × |𝜙011⟩ =
1
2
((|000⟩ + |111⟩) × (|100⟩ − |011⟩))𝑎𝑏𝑐𝑑𝑒𝑓 =
1
2
(|𝜙101⟩|𝜙000⟩ + |𝜙100⟩|𝜙001⟩ + |𝜙000⟩|𝜙101⟩ − |𝜙001⟩|𝜙100⟩)𝑎𝑑𝑏𝑒𝑐𝑓   
|𝜙000⟩ × |𝜙100⟩ =
1
2
((|000⟩ + |111⟩) × (|010⟩ + |101⟩))𝑎𝑏𝑐𝑑𝑒𝑓 =
1
2
(|𝜙000⟩|𝜙010⟩ + |𝜙001⟩|𝜙011⟩ + |𝜙100⟩|𝜙110⟩ − |𝜙101⟩|𝜙111⟩)𝑎𝑑𝑏𝑒𝑐𝑓   
|𝜙000⟩ × |𝜙101⟩ =
1
2
((|000⟩ + |111⟩) × (|010⟩ − |101⟩))𝑎𝑏𝑐𝑑𝑒𝑓 =
1
2
(|𝜙000⟩|𝜙011⟩ + |𝜙001⟩|𝜙010⟩ + |𝜙100⟩|𝜙111⟩ − |𝜙101⟩|𝜙110⟩)𝑎𝑑𝑏𝑒𝑐𝑓   
|𝜙000⟩ × |𝜙110⟩ =
1
2
((|000⟩ + |111⟩) × (|110⟩ + |001⟩))𝑎𝑏𝑐𝑑𝑒𝑓 =
1
2
(|𝜙100⟩|𝜙010⟩ + |𝜙101⟩|𝜙011⟩ + |𝜙000⟩|𝜙110⟩ − |𝜙001⟩|𝜙111⟩)𝑎𝑑𝑏𝑒𝑐𝑓   
|𝜙000⟩ × |𝜙111⟩ =
1
2
((|000⟩ + |111⟩) × (|110⟩ − |001⟩))𝑎𝑏𝑐𝑑𝑒𝑓 =
1
2
(|𝜙100⟩|𝜙011⟩ + |𝜙101⟩|𝜙010⟩ + |𝜙000⟩|𝜙111⟩ − |𝜙001⟩|𝜙110⟩)𝑎𝑑𝑏𝑒𝑐𝑓   
 
2- Based on Bell states: 
GHZ states can be changed to Bell states with entanglement swapping as shown in the following 
example: 
|𝜙000⟩ × |𝜙000⟩ =
1
2
((|000⟩ + |111⟩) × (|000⟩ + |111⟩))𝑎𝑏𝑐𝑑𝑒𝑓
=
1
2√2
(|𝜙+⟩|𝜙+⟩|𝜙+⟩ + |𝜙−⟩|𝜙+⟩|𝜙−⟩ + |𝜙+⟩|𝜙−⟩|𝜙−⟩
+ |𝜙−⟩|𝜙−⟩|𝜙+⟩ + |𝜙+⟩|𝜓+⟩|𝜙+⟩ + |𝜙−⟩|𝜓−⟩|𝜙+⟩ − |𝜙+⟩|𝜓−⟩|𝜙−⟩
− |𝜙−⟩|𝜓+⟩|𝜙−⟩)𝑎𝑑𝑏𝑒𝑐𝑓 
 
 
3. Proposed method without network 
In the proposed protocol, users can transmit their secret message to each other, simultaneously, 
under the control of Charlie – who acts as a controller – with one entangled state as a quantum 
channel. This scheme can be performed in five steps. In the first step, a quantum channel is created 
by Charlie. Checking security of quantum channel is done in the second step. In the third step, users 
encode messages, and secret dialogue is done. Other steps discuss decoding process and extraction 
of the message. 
Step 1: Distribution The controller -Charlie- randomly prepares 2𝑁 + 𝑐 Bell states from the set of 
four state {𝜙+, 𝜙−, 𝜓+, 𝜓−}𝐴𝑥𝐵𝑥 as shown in Eq. (2). 
|𝜙+⟩ =
1
√2
(|00⟩𝐴𝐵 + |11⟩𝐴𝐵) =
1
√2
(| + +⟩𝐴𝐵 + |− −⟩𝐴𝐵),                        
|𝜙−⟩ =
1
√2
(|00⟩𝐴𝐵 − |11⟩𝐴𝐵) =
1
√2
(| + −⟩𝐴𝐵 + |− +⟩𝐴𝐵),  
|𝜓+⟩ =
1
√2
(|01⟩𝐴𝐵 + |10⟩𝐴𝐵) =
1
√2
(| + +⟩𝐴𝐵 − |− −⟩𝐴𝐵),        
|𝜓−⟩ =
1
√2
(|01⟩𝐴𝐵 − |10⟩𝐴𝐵) =
1
√2
(| + −⟩𝐴𝐵 − |− +⟩𝐴𝐵).   
 
(2) 
  
Where 𝑁 is the number of qubits used for encoding the message, 𝑐  is the numbers of qubits used 
for the security checking and 𝑥 = 1,2, … ,2𝑁 + 𝑐. Then, Charlie distributes the qubits 𝐴𝑥 to Alice 
and 𝐵𝑥 to Bob and then both of them acknowledge the receipt of their respective qubits. 
Step 2: Channel verification After Alice and Bob confirm that they received sequences, Alice 
executes security checking step as that she randomly selects 𝑐 ‘checking’ particles and measure 
them randomly in either 𝑋 or 𝑍 basis. After that, she publishes the positions, measurement bases 
and measurement results to Bob by classical channel. Bob perform the same measurement in the 
same bases with Alice in corresponding particles. Alice also sends positions of this particles to 
Charlie. Then, Charlie notify the initial states of these ‘checking’ pairs to Alice and Bob. 
Afterwards, they compare their measurement results. If there is no eavesdropper, measurement 
results related to users must be correlated. If the error rate goes beyond the threshold, they will abort 
the communication, else they will continue to the next step. 
Step 3: Encoding: After verifying the security of quantum channel, from the remaining 2𝑁 pairs, 
Alice and Bob randomly and according to a before conventional together, divide particles for 
transmitting their secret messages to each other. For example, Alice and Bob may simply select odd 
and even pairs, respectively. Then, they randomly create two-particle groups ((𝐴𝑖 , 𝐵𝑖), (𝐴𝑗 , 𝐵𝑗)) in 
their sequences. For example, Alice (Bob) may group particles {𝑃1(𝐴), 𝑃2(𝐴)} ({(𝑃1(𝐵),𝑃2(𝐵)}) in 
Group 1, particles {𝑃3(𝐴),𝑃4(𝐴)} ({𝑃3(𝐵),𝑃4(B)}) in Group 2 and so on. Then, in order to encode 
their two-bit secret message on the i-th group, Alice and Bob performs the following operation on 
their corresponding group, 
𝑓(𝑝, 𝑞, 𝑟, 𝑠) → ((𝜎𝑥
𝑝𝜎𝑧
𝑞)1⨂ 𝐼2)𝐴(𝐼1⨂ (𝜎𝑥
𝑟𝜎𝑧
𝑠)2)𝐵 |Ψ⟩𝐴𝑖𝐵𝑖|Ψ⟩𝐴𝑗𝐵𝑗   
Here, {𝜎𝑧 , 𝜎𝑥, 𝜎𝑦} are Pauli z, x and y operators, respectively. (𝑝, 𝑞) and (𝑟 , 𝑠) ∈  {0,1} denote the 
Alice’s and Bob’s two-bit secret messages, respectively. Based on the secret message, the original 
state |𝐴𝑛𝐵𝑛⟩𝑖 sent by Charlie is encoded into |𝐴𝑛𝐵𝑛⟩𝑖
𝑒 as shown in Table I and Table II by Alice and 
Bob, respectively. 
 
Table 1: Change of states after encoding by Alice. 
Operations on 
𝐴𝑛𝐴𝑚 
Alice Initial state sent by Charlie |𝐴𝑛𝐵𝑛⟩|𝐴𝑚𝐵𝑚⟩  
Secret message |𝜙+⟩ |𝜙−⟩ |𝜓+⟩ |𝜓−⟩ 
𝐼⨂𝐼 0000 |𝜙+⟩|𝜙+⟩ |𝜙−⟩|𝜙−⟩ |𝜓+⟩|𝜓+⟩ |𝜓−⟩|𝜓−⟩ 
State after 
encoding 
|𝐴𝑛𝐵𝑛⟩𝑖
𝑒|𝐴𝑚𝐵𝑚⟩𝑗
𝑒 
𝜎𝑧⨂𝐼 0100 |𝜙
−⟩|𝜙+⟩ |𝜙+⟩|𝜙−⟩ |𝜓−⟩|𝜓+⟩ |𝜓+⟩|𝜓−⟩ 
𝜎𝑥⨂𝐼 1000 |𝜓
+⟩|𝜙+⟩ −|𝜓−⟩|𝜙−⟩ |𝜙+⟩|𝜓+⟩ −|𝜙−⟩|𝜓−⟩ 
(𝜎𝑥𝜎𝑧 = 𝑖𝜎𝑦)⨂𝐼 1100 −|𝜓
−⟩|𝜙+⟩ |𝜓+⟩|𝜙−⟩ −|𝜙−⟩|𝜓+⟩ |𝜙+⟩|𝜓−⟩ 
  
 
Table II: Change of states after encoding by Alice by Bob. 
Operations on 
𝐵𝑛𝐵𝑚 
Bob Initial state sent by Charlie |𝐴𝑛𝐵𝑛⟩|𝐴𝑚𝐵𝑚⟩  
Secret message |𝜙+⟩ |𝜙−⟩ |𝜓+⟩ |𝜓−⟩ 
𝐼⨂𝐼 00 |𝜙+⟩|𝜙+⟩ |𝜙−⟩|𝜙−⟩ |𝜓+⟩|𝜓+⟩ |𝜓−⟩|𝜓−⟩ 
State after 
encoding 
|𝐴𝑛𝐵𝑛⟩𝑖
𝑒|𝐴𝑚𝐵𝑚⟩𝑗
𝑒 
𝐼⨂𝜎𝑧 01 |𝜙
+⟩|𝜙−⟩ |𝜙−⟩|𝜙+⟩ −|𝜓+⟩|𝜓−⟩ −|𝜓−⟩|𝜓+⟩ 
𝐼⨂𝜎𝑥 10 |𝜙
+⟩|𝜓+⟩ |𝜙−⟩|𝜓−⟩ |𝜓+⟩|𝜙+⟩ |𝜓−⟩|𝜙−⟩ 
𝐼⨂𝑖𝜎𝑦 11 |𝜙
+⟩|𝜓−⟩ |𝜙−⟩|𝜓+⟩ −|𝜓+⟩|𝜙−⟩ −|𝜓−⟩|𝜙+⟩ 
 
Step 4: Measurement: Alice (Bob) measures her (his) qubits 𝐴𝑖, 𝐴𝑗  (𝐵𝑖, 𝐵𝑗) in the Bell basis and 
obtain outcomes 𝑎𝑖𝑗  ( 𝑏𝑖𝑗 ) respectively where {𝑎𝑖𝑗, 𝑏𝑖𝑗} ∈  {00, 01, 10, 11} . They notify their 
measurement results to each other over an authenticated classical channel. Results of entanglement 
swapping for each two initial Bell-state are showed in Table 3 and Eq. 3. In this Table, entanglement 
swapping for each two arbitrary Bell-state are labeled to four groups 𝐶0 to 𝐶3 as [45]. As shown in 
Eq. (3), after entanglement swapping, each two initial Bell-state are converted to four unique 
combination that these combinations only are repeated once in each group 𝐶0 to 𝐶3. 
𝐶0 →  {|𝜙
+⟩𝐴1𝐴2|𝜙
+⟩𝐵1𝐵2 , |𝜙
−⟩𝐴1𝐴2|𝜙
−⟩𝐵1𝐵2 , |𝜓
+⟩𝐴1𝐴2|𝜓
+⟩𝐵1𝐵2 , |𝜓
−⟩𝐴1𝐴2|𝜓
−⟩𝐵1𝐵2},  
 
(3) 
𝐶1 →  {|𝜙
−⟩𝐴1𝐴2|𝜙
+⟩𝐵1𝐵2 , |𝜙
+⟩𝐴1𝐴2|𝜙
−⟩𝐵1𝐵2 , |𝜓
+⟩𝐴1𝐴2|𝜓
−⟩𝐵1𝐵2 , |𝜓
−⟩𝐴1𝐴2|𝜓
+⟩𝐵1𝐵2}, 
𝐶2 →  {|𝜙
+⟩𝐴1𝐴2|𝜓
+⟩𝐵1𝐵2 , |𝜙
−⟩𝐴1𝐴2|𝜓
−⟩𝐵1𝐵2 , |𝜓
+⟩𝐴1𝐴2|𝜙
+⟩𝐵1𝐵2 , |𝜓
−⟩𝐴1𝐴2|𝜙
−⟩𝐵1𝐵2}, 
𝐶3 →  {|𝜙
−⟩𝐴1𝐴2|𝜓
+⟩𝐵1𝐵2 , |𝜙
+⟩𝐴1𝐴2|𝜓
−⟩𝐵1𝐵2 , |𝜓
−⟩𝐴1𝐴2|𝜙
+⟩𝐵1𝐵2 , |𝜓
+⟩𝐴1𝐴2|𝜙
−⟩𝐵1𝐵2}. 
 
Table 3: outputs of entanglement swapping for each two arbitrary Bell-state. 
states |𝜙+⟩𝐴2𝐵2 |𝜙
−⟩𝐴2𝐵2 |𝜓
+⟩𝐴2𝐵2 |𝜓
−⟩𝐴2𝐵2 
|𝜙+⟩𝐴1𝐵1 𝐶0 𝐶1 𝐶2 𝐶3 
|𝜙−⟩𝐴1𝐵1 𝐶1 𝐶0 𝐶3 𝐶2 
|𝜓+⟩𝐴1𝐵1 𝐶2 𝐶3 𝐶0 𝐶1 
|𝜓−⟩𝐴1𝐵1 𝐶3 𝐶2 𝐶1 𝐶0 
 
Step 5: Permission If the controller wants the communication to proceed, he announces – over an 
authenticated channel– the two initial Bell states {𝐴𝑖𝐵𝑖, 𝐴𝑗𝐵𝑗} using four classical bits {𝑐𝑖𝑖 , 𝑐𝑗𝑗}  ∈
 {00, 01, 10, 11} to Alice and Bob. Using this knowledge and the measurement results 𝑏𝑖𝑗(𝑎𝑖𝑗) from 
the previous step, it becomes possible for Alice (Bob) to obtain 𝑝𝑞 (𝑟𝑠) – the secret message from 
the other end. However, if the controller does not want the bidirectional direct communication to 
proceed, he simply does not reveal anything and none of the parties, have any information about the 
other parties’ secret message. 
Example Let us clarify the above protocol using an example. Let us assume that the two Bell states 
initially distributed by the controller are |𝐴𝑖𝐵𝑖⟩ = |𝜙
+⟩𝐴𝑖𝐵𝑖  and |𝐴𝑗𝐵𝑗⟩ = |𝜙
−⟩𝐴𝑗𝐵𝑗  and also let 
Alice’s (Bob’s) secret message be 𝑝𝑞 =  00 (𝑟𝑠 =  01). After the encoding step the states become, 
 
|, Ω⟩ = |𝜙+⟩𝐴𝑖𝐵𝑖⨂|𝜙
−⟩𝐴𝑗𝐵𝑗
𝑝𝑞=00
→    
𝑟𝑠=01
 |𝜙+⟩𝐴𝑖𝐵𝑖⨂|𝜙
+⟩𝐴𝑗𝐵𝑗 = |Ω⟩
𝑒 
 
{
 
 
 
 
|𝜙+⟩𝐴0𝐴1|𝜙
+⟩𝐵0𝐵1
|𝜙−⟩𝐴0𝐴1|𝜙
−⟩𝐵0𝐵1
|𝜓+⟩𝐴0𝐴1|𝜓
+⟩𝐵0𝐵1
|𝜓−⟩𝐴0𝐴1|𝜓
−⟩𝐵0𝐵1
→ 𝐶0 
 
 
 
 
 
(4) 
 
After entanglement swapping and measuring of corresponding particles by Alice and Bob, the 
measurement results will be one of four terms in 𝐶0 as shown in Eq. (4). For instance, if Alice’s 
measurement result be |𝜓+⟩ then Bob’s measurement result will also be |𝜓+⟩. Afterwards, they 
notify the measurement results to each other. After that, according to Table 3, they can understand 
that entanglement swapping is type 𝐶0. At the permission step, Charlie notify the type of prepared 
initial states to Alice and Bob (in this case  |𝜙+⟩𝐴0𝐵0⨂|𝜙
−⟩𝐴1𝐵1). Using this information, Alice and 
Bob know after encoding of their secret messages (00 and 01) |𝐴𝑖𝐵𝑖⟩ = |𝜙
+⟩ and |𝐴𝑗𝐵𝑗⟩ = |𝜙
+⟩ 
become |𝐴𝑖𝐵𝑖⟩
𝑒 = |𝜙+⟩  and |𝐴𝑗𝐵𝑗⟩
𝑒
= |𝜙−⟩ , they can understand the main states sent by 
themselves and infer the secret messages that each of them has received from other. It is due to 
terms placed in each of the groups 𝐶0 to 𝐶4 are independent from other and the terms only are 
repeated once in each group. 
 
4. Generalization 
In the proposed method, larger entanglement states can be used for transmitting more 
information at the same time which is led to increasing of efficiency in the protocol. For this 
aim, GHZ state can be used instead of Bell states. So, the initial state can be written as the 
following: 
1
2
((|000⟩ + |111⟩)(|000⟩ + |111⟩))𝑎0𝑎1𝑏0𝑎2𝑏1𝑏2 
Which 𝑎0, 𝑎1 and 𝑎2 belong to Alice and also, 𝑏0, 𝑏1 and 𝑏2 belong to Bob. 
In this case, they can encode their qubits as the following: 
𝑓(𝑝, 𝑞, 𝑟, 𝑠, 𝑡, 𝑢, 𝑘, 𝑦)
→ ((𝜎𝑥
𝑝𝜎𝑧
𝑞)1⨂ (𝜎𝑥
𝑟𝜎𝑧
𝑠)2⨂𝐼3)𝐴( 𝐼⨂(𝜎𝑥
𝑡𝜎𝑧
𝑢)2⨂(𝜎𝑥
𝑘𝜎𝑧
𝑦)3)𝐵 |Ψ⟩𝐴0𝑖𝐴1𝑖𝐵0𝑖|Ψ⟩𝐴2𝑗𝐵1𝑗𝐵2𝑗  
Other steps are the same as explained in the previous one. 
5. Proposed method with network 
In this Section, a protocol of QSDC-based network is presented. This protocol communicates 
between three users in the network. It can be explained as the following scenario:  
Suppose there are three users Alice, Bob and Elena with a supervisor _Charlie as the controller. 
Alice, Bob, and Elena want to communicate together and transmit their messages each to others 
so that each user only can receive and decode the corresponding message to himself/herself. 
Also, Charlie cannot understand the messages and only he can monitor the communication. This 
scenario can be described by the following protocol: 
Step 1: Distribution The controller -Charlie- such as previous one, randomly prepares 2𝑁 + 𝑐 
GHZ states from the set of eight state {𝜙}𝑖𝑗𝑘  𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘 𝜖{0,1} as shown in Eq. (5). 
|𝜙000⟩ =
1
√2
(|000⟩ + |111⟩), 
|𝜙001⟩ =
1
√2
(|000⟩ − |111⟩), 
|𝜙010⟩ =
1
√2
(|100⟩ + |011⟩), 
|𝜙011⟩ =
1
√2
(|100⟩ − |011⟩), 
|𝜙100⟩ =
1
√2
(|010⟩ + |101⟩), 
|𝜙101⟩ =
1
√2
(|010⟩ − |101⟩), 
|𝜙110⟩ =
1
√2
(|110⟩ + |001⟩), 
|𝜙111⟩ =
1
√2
(|110⟩ − |001⟩) . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(5) 
 
Where 𝑁 is the number of qubits used for encoding the message, 𝑐  is the numbers of qubits used 
for the security checking. Then, Charlie distributes the qubits 𝐴𝑥 to Alice, 𝐵𝑥 to Bob and 𝐶𝑥 to Elena 
(𝑥 = 1,2, … ,2𝑁 + 𝑐) and then each of them acknowledge the receipt of their respective qubits. 
Step 2: Channel verification After Alice, Bob and Elena confirm that they received sequences, 
Alice executes security checking step as that she randomly selects 𝑐 ‘checking’ particles and 
measure them randomly in either 𝑋 or 𝑍 basis. After that, she publishes the positions, measurement 
bases and measurement results to Bob and Elena by classical channels. Bob and Elena perform the 
same measurements in the same bases with Alice in corresponding particles. Alice also sends 
positions of this particles to Charlie. Then, Charlie notify the initial states of these ‘checking’ pairs 
to Alice, Bob and Charlie. Afterwards, they compare their measurement results. If there is no 
eavesdropper, measurement results related to users must be correlated. If the error rate goes beyond 
the threshold, they will abort the communication, else they will continue to the next step. 
Step 3: Encoding: After verifying the security of quantum channel, from the remaining 2𝑁 pairs, 
Alice, Bob and Elena randomly and according to a previous agreement together, divide particles for 
transmitting their secret messages to each other. For example, Alice, Bob and Elena may simply 
select pairs divisible by three, respectively. Then, they randomly create three-particle groups 
((𝐴𝑖, 𝐵𝑖, 𝐶𝑖), (𝐴𝑗 , 𝐵𝑗, 𝐶𝑗)) in their sequences. For example, Alice (Bob) or Elena may group particles 
{𝑃1(𝐴), 𝑃2(𝐴)} ({(𝑃1(𝐵),𝑃2(𝐵)}) or {𝑃1(𝐶), 𝑃2(𝐶)} in Group 1, particles {𝑃3(𝐴),𝑃4(𝐴)} 
({𝑃3(𝐵),𝑃4(B)}) or {𝑃3(𝐶),𝑃4(𝐶)} in Group 2 and so on. Then, in order to encode their two-bit 
secret message on the i-th group, Alice, Bob and Elena performs the following operation on their 
corresponding group, 
𝑓(𝑝, 𝑞, 𝑟, 𝑠, 𝑘, 𝑦) → ((𝜎𝑥
𝑝𝜎𝑧
𝑞)1⨂ 𝐼2)𝐴(𝐼1⨂ (𝜎𝑥
𝑟𝜎𝑧
𝑠)2)𝐵(𝐼1⨂ (𝜎𝑥
𝑘𝜎𝑧
𝑦)2 )𝐶  |Ψ⟩𝐴𝑖𝐵𝑖𝐶𝑖|Ψ⟩𝐴𝑗𝐵𝑗𝐶𝑗  
Or  
𝑓(𝑝, 𝑞, 𝑟, 𝑠, 𝑘, 𝑦) → ((𝜎𝑥
𝑝𝜎𝑧
𝑞)1⨂ 𝐼2)𝐴( (𝜎𝑥
𝑟𝜎𝑧
𝑠)1⨂𝐼2)𝐵( (𝜎𝑥
𝑘𝜎𝑧
𝑦)1 ⨂𝐼2)𝐶  |Ψ⟩𝐴𝑖𝐵𝑖𝐶𝑖|Ψ⟩𝐴𝑗𝐵𝑗𝐶𝑗  
 
Other steps of the protocol are the same as the main protocol in the first section. 
 6. Security 
In the proposed protocol, security analysis is only needed in the step of distributing the entangled 
pairs from Charlie to Alice-Bob. Due to using of entanglement swapping, the secret bits are not 
transmitted through the channel. So, it is only possible that Eve (eavesdropper) attack in step of 
preparation of channel (Step 1). In the rest of this section, three important types of security analyses 
are performed: controller permission review, review of control of eavesdropper and review of 
possible Attacks of an eavesdropper. 
6.1. Security analysis without the controller’s permission 
Lack of receiving information by the receiver without the controller’s permission is one of the 
important issues in Bidirectional Controlled Quantum Secure Direct Communication (BCQSDC) 
protocols. Sending information in the proposed protocol is bidirectional, i.e., two users can send 
information to each other, simultaneously. But for obtaining information and decoding them, users 
need to know the information about the initial states sent by the controller. Without receiving this 
information, they cannot get any part of the secret messages. For example, consider the first example 
stated in this paper where Alice and Bob send secret messages 00 and 01 to each other 
simultaneously. For detecting their secret messages if they do not know initial state, according to 
Tables 1, 2 and 3, because of the distribution of same probability between initial states they cannot 
detect secret messages as shown in Eq. (5). 
𝑃(𝑥𝑦 = 00|𝑘𝑙) = 𝑃(𝑥𝑦 = 01|𝑘𝑙) = 𝑃(𝑥𝑦 = 10|𝑘𝑙) = 𝑃(𝑥𝑦 = 11|𝑘𝑙) =
1
16
  
𝑘𝑙 ∈ {(00), (01), (10), (11)}  
(5) 
  
Here, 𝑃(𝑥𝑦 = 11|𝑘𝑙) is the probability that the initial bell state is xy = 11 that given the secret 
message was 𝑘𝑙. Security analysis with showing all of the classical information. 
Also, if Eve achieves all of the classical information transmitted by users and controller. She cannot 
get any part of the secret messages. Because she needs to mental knowledge of users to their secret 
messages i.e., Alice and Bob only themselves know about their secret messages that had sent to each 
other. For example, in the first example, Alice and Bob know secret messages sent by themselves 
are 00 and 01, respectively. And they only know this information and no anyone. We can present 
this case with the same probabilities as shown in Eq. (6). 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑘𝑙 = 00|𝑥𝑦𝑚𝑛𝑜𝑝) = 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑘𝑙 = 01|𝑥𝑦𝑚𝑛𝑜𝑝) = 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑘𝑙 = 10|𝑥𝑦𝑚𝑛𝑜𝑝) = 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑘𝑙 = 11|𝑥𝑦𝑚𝑛𝑜𝑝) =
1
4
  
𝑘𝑙,𝑚𝑛, 𝑜𝑝 ∈ {(00), (01), (10), (11)}  
(6) 
 
Where variable 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 indicate the probability of achieving to the secret message sent by Alice 
(Bob). Also, 𝑘𝑙  indicate the secret message sent by Alice (Bob) and also 𝑥𝑦  and 𝑚𝑛  present 
classical information sent by Alice and Bob to each other. In addition, 𝑜𝑝 show classical information 
sent by Charlie to Alice and Bob. 
6.2.Security analysis against Eve’s Attacks   
This section shows that the proposed protocol is secure against three types of attacks: 1) intercept-
and-resend attack 2) controlled- not attack, and 3) entanglement-and-measure attack [46, 47]. These 
attacks are described with details in the following: 
6.2.1. Intercept-and-resend attack 
In this attack, Eve may attempt to play the role of Alice or Bob to read the secret message. In this 
case, the presence of eavesdropper can be realized in security checking (the second step) since there 
are no correlations at all between the qubits Alice (Bob), Charlie’s classical information and the 
fake ones.  
6.2.2. Controlled-not attack  
In this attack, Eve wants to achieve secret messages by adding additional qubits to channel and 
measuring them. For this aim, she intercepts the qubits sent from Charlie to Alice (Bob) and then 
performs controlled-not gate to add one additional qubit on each EPR state. This attack can be 
detected in security checking step or second step. Because there are not correlations between 
particles again. 
6.2.3. Entanglement-and-measure attack 
In this attack, Eve wants to achieve partial information by entangling her auxiliary qubit, |𝐸𝑖⟩, with 
a qubit 𝑎 (𝑏) before Alice (Bob) received it (assumed to be in the state |𝑖⟩, with 𝑖 ∈ {0,1}). Assume 
Eve uses unitary operation 𝑃𝑁𝐸, on the pairs 𝑎(𝑏) and her qubit, 𝐸. We can describe it as Eq. (7). 
𝑃𝑁𝐸|𝑖⟩|𝐸𝑖⟩ = 𝛼|𝑖⟩|𝐸𝑖⟩ + 𝛽|𝑖⨁1⟩|𝐸𝑖 ⨁1⟩,     |𝛼|
2 + |𝛽|2 = 1  (7) 
 
Where ⟨𝐸𝑖|𝐸𝑖 ⨁1⟩ = 0 and 𝑁 is Alice’s (Bob’s) qubit. Then Eve resends 𝑁 to Alice (Bob). In this 
case, Eve will be realized with a probability |𝛽|2 in security checking process in the second step. 
7. Comparison 
In this paper, we present a Bidirectional Controlled Quantum Secure Direct Communication 
(BCQSDC) protocol using EPR pairs via entanglement swapping for transmitting secret messages. 
Unlike previous works [34, 38, 41], in this work, two users can transmit two-qubit to each other, 
simultaneously. In this work, we use lower resources into previous works.  
For analysis and comparison of efficiency QSDC protocols, the bellow definition is used [41, 48].  
𝜂1 =
𝑚𝑢
𝑞𝑘 + 𝑏𝑘
, (8) 
Where 𝑚𝑢, 𝑞𝑘 and 𝑏𝑘 indicate the number of secret bits, the number of total qubits and the number 
of classical bits respectively. Since transmission of qubits is more complex and expensive than the 
classical bits, we can redefine the efficiency as Eq. (9). 
𝜂2 =
𝑚𝑢
𝑞𝑘
 
(9) 
 
Table 4 shows a comparison of the efficiency of the proposed protocol with the previous schemes. 
It is obvious that the efficiency of the proposed protocol is higher than previous protocols. Also, 
previous protocols are one way and they for converting their protocols to bidirectional, need to run 
their protocol twice [32, 41], i.e., they need to the number of qubits same with Alice for Bob to 
create a protocol for sending qubits from Bob to Alice named so-called a quantum dialogue (QD). 
But our protocol is bidirectional. 
Furthermore, the number of security checking phases in our protocol and in [6] is one. Also, in our 
protocol and in [6] qubits aren’t send directly and these protocols used from the feature of 
entanglement swapping into other works. So, the number of security checking steps is reduced. But, 
our work is very better than [6] in term of efficiency and our method is bidirectional. But the method 
in [6] is one way. Bidirectional means that Alice and Bob can transmit a two-qubit state to each 
other, simultaneously under permission of a controller by one entangled state as a quantum channel. 
Protocol Type 𝑚𝑢 𝑞𝑘 𝑏𝑘 𝜂1 (%) 𝜂2 (%) 
The number of 
Security Check 
The number of 
channels 
Direct sending 
of qubits 
[32] BCQSDC 4 8 4 33.33 50 3 2 Yes 
[34] CQSDC 2 6 3 22.22 33.33 1 One way No 
[41] BQSDC 4 8 4 33.33 50 2 2 Yes 
Our 
Method 
BCQSDC 4 4 8 33.33 100 1 1 No 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, a Controlled Bidirectional Quantum Secure Direct Communication (CBQSDC) was 
presented that users can transmit two-bit message using EPR pairs to each other simultaneously 
under the permission of the controller. Also, in this method entanglement swapping was used for 
transmitting the secret message. So, no information is directly transmitted in the quantum channel. 
Due to using of entanglement swapping, the number of security checking steps was reduced. Also, 
in the proposed protocol, the number of used quantum resources was reduced into previous ones. 
The proposed protocol effectively improved the efficiency of the previous ones. 
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